Start with the deployed program
Compare the active program address with the public source verification record and IDL. Then connect a specific wager to its round, randomness or commitments and settlement receipt. A verified build is evidence about code identity, not proof that all possible behavior is safe.
What makes an onchain game provably fair?
A useful fairness claim identifies how an outcome is produced, what binds it to the accepted wager and which checks prevent changing it afterward. Merely displaying a transaction or a moving dice model does not establish those properties.
SoltoshiDICE uses different mechanisms for different games. Randomness games need fresh, authenticated random input. A choice game needs hidden commitments. Poker must additionally protect the deck order and private cards.
The six games, compared
- Cee-lo: ORAO randomness and native dice rules; the browser animates the settled result.
- Street Fights: ORAO randomness expanded into a deterministic, replayable combat sequence.
- Blackjack: fresh MagicBlock base-layer VRF requests as draws are needed; not an exposed future deck.
- Lucky Block: one MagicBlock base-layer VRF request per spin, fixed reel strips and rejection sampling.
- Hold’em: encrypted multi-party dealing; clients verify shuffle/lock proofs, while Solana checks openings, betting and settlement.
- Rock, paper, scissors: salted SHA-256 commitments and signed reveals; no oracle decides players’ moves.
Follow a result from wager to payment
Begin with the accepted game or round identity and stake. Inspect the request or commitment and the rule version. Compare the resulting cards, dice, reel stops or score with the published rules, then check the settlement transaction and recipient.
The game exposes History, TX links and game-specific proof controls. The open source repository contains rule implementations and verifiers. Poker has an important limit: clients verify the live transcript, but the relay does not retain the complete shuffle transcript for every finished hand.
Fairness is not guaranteed profit or availability
A fair random game can still have a house edge. Proofs do not eliminate contract defects, compromised clients, collusion assumptions, provider outages or transaction delays. Poker’s n−1 board recovery also creates an early-board collusion assumption.
The repository and implementation explanations are not an independent security audit. Review the game-specific rules, current contract addresses and recovery conditions before staking funds.